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Abstract
The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act requires
welfare recipients to look for work and has made it more difficult for nonworking
recipients to remain on the welfare rolls. In addition, the economic boom of the 1990s
and changes in federal and state policies have raised the net income gain associated
with moving from welfare to work. This paper analyzes data from a panel survey of
single mothers, all of whom received welfare in February 1997. In 1999, those who left
welfare and were working had a higher household income and lower poverty rate,
experienced a similar level of material hardship, engaged in fewer activities to make
ends meet, and had lower expectations of experiencing hardship in the near future
than did nonworking welfare recipients. Estimations of fixed-effect regressions of
income that control for both observable and unobservable time-invariant characteris-
tics show that monthly net income increases by $2.63 for every additional hour of
work effort. About 60 percent of the observed monthly income difference between
wage-reliant and welfare-reliant mothers can be attributed to differences in their work
effort. Thus, after welfare reform, it does pay to move from welfare to work .© 2002 by
the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.
INTRODUCTION
Prior to the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 (PRWORA), conventional wisdom held that it did not pay to move from wel-
fare to work. Economists emphasized the high marginal tax rate implicit in the Aid
to Families with Dependent Children Program (AFDC). According to Rebecca
Blank, “When a woman goes to work, her benefits decline rapidly as her earnings
increase. This means that her income gains from employment are limited, since she
loses close to a dollar in benefits for every dollar she gains from work” (1997, p.
146). Sociologists emphasized the difficulties in coping strategies caused by the
transition from welfare to work. Kathryn Edin and Laura Lein concluded that
“mothers generally found it more difficult to make ends meet when they worked
than when they collected welfare” (1996, p. 254). 
This paper reports an analysis of data gathered from a panel study of single
mothers who received cash welfare in an urban Michigan county in February 1997.
It addresses the question: Does it pay to move from welfare to work in the after-
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math of the 1996 welfare reform? The key finding is that by the late 1990s, single
mothers who had been welfare recipients were, on average, financially better off
working or combining work and welfare than remaining as nonworking welfare
recipients. Mothers who were working in Fall 1999, about 34 months after the sam-
ple was drawn, had a higher household income and lower poverty rate, experienced
similar levels of material hardship, engaged in fewer activities to make ends meet,
and had lower expectations of experiencing hardship in the near future than did
nonworking welfare recipients. Nonetheless, almost half of the work-reliant
respondents were poor in 1998, about half experienced at least two material hard-
ships in the year before the Fall 1999 interview, and more than one-third had no
medical insurance.
ECONOMIC AND PUBLIC POLICY CHANGES IN THE 1990s
The relative financial benefits of moving from welfare to work changed dramatical-
ly over the course of the 1990s. First, several policy changes were implemented that
affected the net income of single mothers. PRWORA replaced the entitlement pro-
gram, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), with the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. TANF reduces the likelihood that a
single mother can “choose” to remain a welfare recipient, because even if she finds
that the economic benefits of working do not exceed its costs, cash assistance is con-
ditional on the performance of work-related activities or community service. Work
requirements and the fact that states must sanction recipients who do not comply
with requirements reduce a nonworking recipient’s expected welfare income. In
addition, the imposition of a 60-month lifetime limit on benefit receipt increased
pressure to enter the labor force.
In response to PRWORA’s granting them more autonomy, 36 states have increased
“earnings disregards,” which allow recipients to have some earnings that do not
directly offset welfare benefits (Acs et al., 1998; Gallagher et al., 1998; Pavetti, 2002).
Most states have also increased spending on child care for recipients and former
recipients. Taken together, these changes require more recipients to look for work,
make it more difficult for nonworking recipients to receive cash assistance, and make
it easier for them to receive cash and child care assistance if they have low earnings.
Policy changes outside welfare have also increased the benefits of moving from
welfare to work. The minimum wage increased from $4.25 to $5.15 in 1997, and a
major expansion of the earned income tax credit (EITC) increased the maximum
credit from $950 in 1990 to $2272 in 1998 for a working single mother with one
child, and to $3756 for those with two or more children. 
Prior to reform, the move from welfare to work typically left both the mother and
children uninsured because most jobs recipients take do not provide employer-sub-
sidized insurance. Transitional Medicaid covers adults leaving TANF for a year.
However, the State Child Health Insurance Program (CHIP) of 1997 and changes in
Medicaid policy have expanded coverage, making jobs that do not provide health
care coverage more attractive. States can now cover low-income working parents
who have no recent connection to cash welfare and can establish Medicaid eligibil-
ity limits much higher than those in the past (Broaddus et al., 2002). By the end of
the 1990s, leaving welfare for work was less likely to result in a mother and her chil-
dren being uninsured.
The labor market in the late 1990s was much tighter than it had been for several
decades, increasing the likelihood that recipients who must search for work will find
jobs (Holzer and Stoll, 2001). In October 1991, the national unemployment rate for
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adult females was 5.9 percent; it had fallen to 3.6 percent by October 1999 (about
the time of the interviews that gathered the data reported here).
Against this background of state and federal policy changes and a long economic
boom, welfare caseloads fell dramatically after the mid-1990s. Some of this decline
was due to welfare reform and the associated policy changes; some to the booming
economy (Danziger, 1999). No attempt has been made to account for the relative
contribution of the various economic and policy changes to the finding that current
and former welfare recipients who are working are financially better off than non-
working welfare recipients. To do so requires a behavioral model of labor supply and
welfare participation decisions that is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, we
document how the economic circumstances of former and current recipients who
are working compare to those of nonworking welfare recipients.
RELATED STUDIES
Results discussed here are the first to be based on post-welfare reform panel data that
include detailed information on both “welfare leavers” and “welfare stayers.” Related
studies analyze economic well-being among work-reliant and welfare-reliant single
mothers with data gathered before welfare reform; other studies evaluate the effec-
tiveness of policy changes in the late 1990s in encouraging single mothers to move
from welfare to work; others assess the well-being of welfare leavers.
These studies do not directly address whether, in the aftermath of the 1996 reform,
it pays to move from welfare to work. Addressing this issue requires panel data on
the subsequent income and experience of material hardship of a sample that includes
both welfare leavers and welfare stayers. When we compare the well-being of women
in our panel, we distinguish between workers who have left welfare, those who are
combining work and welfare, and those who are nonworking welfare stayers.
Most studies of welfare leavers have no information on welfare stayers, and tend
to include limited data on the income sources and material hardships of leavers.
They answer the question, “What is the financial well-being of all recipients who
have left welfare, whether or not they are working?” 
Pre-Welfare Reform Studies
The pre-welfare reform literature provides mixed evidence on whether or not it does
pay to leave welfare for work. Edin and Lein (1996, 1997) conclude that the eco-
nomic benefits of working are outweighed by the economic costs associated with
work. Between 1988 and 1992, they interviewed 165 single mothers who were work-
ing but not currently receiving welfare (whom they call wage reliant) and 214 single
mothers who were currently receiving welfare, some of whom were working in the
formal or informal labor market (welfare reliant). The women were selected using
“snowball” survey techniques in four urban areas and were asked detailed questions
about income sources, consumption patterns, and experiences of material hardship.
Working mothers did have a higher average income than welfare mothers. However,
Edin and Lein concluded that the former fared worse economically than the latter
because, in most cases, the costs of work eroded this income advantage. In addition,
42 percent of working mothers lacked health insurance, whereas Medicaid covered
all welfare mothers.
In contrast, analyses of nationally representative samples find that women who
work are financially better off than those who are welfare reliant. Bauman (2000),
using the 1991 and 1992 panels of the Survey of Income and Program
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Participation (SIPP), finds that women who left welfare have a lower poverty rate
and similar levels of material hardship than those who remain on welfare.
Similarly, using the 1992 SIPP panel, Beverly (2000) finds that poor households
with children who met current TANF work requirements reported lower levels of
food insufficiency, eviction, and lack of phone service, and an overall higher
income-to-needs ratio than those who did not work. She also finds that poor
households who were employed reported more medical needs than those in non-
working households. 
In addition to using data gathered before the implementation of TANF and the
other policy changes of the late 1990s, these studies do not directly answer the ques-
tion regarding the economic benefits of moving from welfare to work because their
samples include many women who have not received welfare and who are likely to
differ in important ways from welfare recipients.
Evaluations of Policy Changes in the Late 1990s
Conclusions from studies that evaluate the benefits of moving from welfare to work
after welfare reform are mixed. Ellwood (2000) and Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000)
find that policies implemented in the 1990s increased the financial benefits of mov-
ing from welfare to work. Less positive results are reported by Bavier (2001a),
Cancian et al. (2002), and Wolfe (2002). 
Ellwood (2000) describes a hypothetical scenario in which a nonworking welfare
recipient taking a full-time job paying the minimum wage would have increased her
net income by $2005 (24 percent) in 1986, but by $7119 (95 percent) in 1996. Meyer
and Rosenbaum (2000) examine the effect of policy changes on the employment of
single mothers over the 1984–1996 period using data from the Current Population
Surveys. They document the increased returns to working that result from the
expanded availability of federal and state earned income tax credits and the expan-
sion of Medicaid eligibility.
Post-welfare reform, there is great variation among states in the incentive struc-
ture facing women moving from welfare to work. Wolfe’s (2002) analysis of
Wisconsin confirms that at low levels of earnings, marginal tax rates are now lower
than they were before reform. However, marginal tax rates in Wisconsin now
exceed 100 percent when earnings range between $12,000 and $30,000, more than
they were before reform.
Bavier (2001a) uses SIPP data to compare employment rates and incomes asso-
ciated with welfare exits and re-entries in the 1996–1997 period. He finds that the
median leaver experienced a decline of about $50 in household income in the exit
month relative to the month before exit. In further analyses comparing pre- and
post-welfare reform cohorts, Bavier (2001b) finds that recipients post-welfare
reform were more likely to have earnings than recipients pre-welfare reform.
However, once off the rolls, post-reform leavers were more likely than earlier leavers
to experience economic difficulties.
Cancian et al. (2002) use administrative data from Wisconsin and find that more
than half of women who left AFDC in 1995 and 1997 increased their earnings with-
in one year of exiting welfare relative to their earnings while on welfare. Fewer than
one-third of leavers, however, improved their total income relative to what it was
before their welfare exit (as measured by the value of their post-tax earnings plus
food stamps and cash assistance, but not including the income of other household
members or other transfer income). Three years after exiting welfare, 59 percent of
the 1995 leaver families remained poor. 
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Thus, Bavier (2001a), Cancian et al. (2002), and Wolfe (2002) show only modest
improvements, or slight declines, in financial well-being for those moving from wel-
fare to work. However, these studies do not present comprehensive measures of the
extent of changes in the financial well-being of women who make the transition
from being nonworking welfare recipients to being working nonrecipients.
In this paper, data from the Women’s Employment Study (WES) are analyzed.
The data include comprehensive measures of income, experiences of material hard-
ship, hardship-mediating activities, and expectations of future hardship. Using
panel data, a fixed-effects model is estimated that controls for both measured
observed and unobserved time-invariant characteristics of working leavers and
nonworking stayers.
DATA
Respondents in the Women’s Employment Study were systematically selected with
equal probability from an ordered list of single mothers with children who received
welfare benefits in an urban Michigan county in February 1997. Eligible respon-
dents resided in this county, received cash assistance from Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families (TANF), were U.S. citizens between age 18 and 54, and were either
Caucasian or African-American.1 Interviews were conducted with the women in
Fall 1997, Fall 1998, and Fall 1999. The response rate was 86 percent for the first
wave (n = 753), 92 percent for the second wave (n = 693), and 91 percent for the
third wave (n = 632) of the panel study. The first two interviews lasted approxi-
mately one hour; the third, about 90 minutes.2
The Fall 1999 interview, upon which the following discussion is based, occurred
about 34 months after the sample was drawn. Respondents were asked to report,
for the month before the interview, work hours, earnings, welfare receipt, income
from a variety of sources, and work-related child-care and transportation expenses.
Monthly income sources include own earnings, earnings of other household mem-
bers, cash assistance from TANF, food stamps, Social Security and other pension
and disability income, such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI), unemployment
compensation, child support, cash contributions from friends and family outside
the household, and any other sources of income not previously mentioned. They
were also asked about total own earnings and total household income for calendar
year 1998. (An appendix providing details on variable definitions and measurement
issues is available from the authors upon request.) 
Respondents were also asked about 10 kinds of material hardship-food problems,
lack of health insurance (mother), unmet medical needs (mother), lack of health
insurance (child), unmet medical needs (child), housing upkeep problems, utility
cutoffs, evictions, experiences of homelessness, and disconnection of a telephone.
These hardships are similar to those reported in Mayer and Jencks (1989) and Edin
and Lein (1997, p. 113). 
Respondents were asked about their subjective assessments of well-being (“How
difficult is it to live on your income right now?”) and whether they had engaged in
any of the following activities to make ends meet in the six months before the inter-
view—pawned or sold personal possessions; provided blood or plasma for cash;
1 The sample frame included active single-parent with child cases and excluded child only and two-par-
ent cases.
2 Respondents interviewed at the first three waves represent 72 percent of the original sample, i.e., 0.86
x 0.92 x 0.91. A fourth interview was completed in Fall 2001 with a 91 percent response rate.
676 / Does It Pay to Move from Welfare to Work?
sold or traded food stamps; engaged in illegal activity; and received food, shelter, or
clothing from a charity in the previous 12 months.
Given the high response rate and the extensive survey instrument, these data are
well-suited for testing the hypothesis that, in the post-welfare reform era, single
mothers who move from welfare to work are financially better off than if they had
remained nonworking welfare recipients. Michigan’s welfare policies are quite sim-
ilar to those of many other states. For example, women in Michigan who worked
part-time at minimum wage jobs were at the median for monthly net income
among 12 states that contained a large portion of the nation’s population and about
half of the 1998 caseload (Acs et al., 1998). While the study uses data only from
Michigan, the policy and economic conditions in Michigan are broadly representa-
tive of the majority of the TANF caseload.
RESULTS
Respondents are classified into four mutually exclusive categories based on their
work and welfare status in the month before the survey when current economic
well-being is analyzed, and into five mutually exclusive work and welfare categories
when well-being over a one-year period is analyzed.
Monthly Income
In Table 1, wage-reliant mothers are defined as those among the 632 respondents
who reported earnings, but who, according to the state agency, received no cash
assistance in the month prior to the Fall 1999 interview; they represent 54.7 percent
of the sample (n = 346).3
Combiners are defined as women who both reported earnings and received cash
assistance in the month before the interview; they represent 18.0 percent of the
sample (n = 114). This group is more common post-welfare reform than in the early
1990s because of the increased earned income disregards. Welfare-reliant mothers
are defined as those who reported no income from earnings in the month prior to
the interview, but who are reported by the state agency as receiving TANF; they rep-
resent 13.8 percent of the Fall 1999 sample (n = 87). The remaining 13.4 percent (n
= 85) of the sample includes women who were neither working nor receiving TANF
benefits in Fall 1999.4
Thus, in Fall 1999, about three-quarters of all respondents were working (wage-
reliant plus combiners), and about one-third were receiving TANF (welfare-reliant
plus combiners). There was a large movement from welfare to work over the study
period, as all respondents received cash assistance in February 1997 and only about
40 percent worked at that time. At wave one, 21.4 percent were wage-reliant; at
3 Some women told us that they received welfare income in the month prior to the survey; however, the
welfare agency record says they did not receive assistance in that month. We classified them as wage-
reliant in Table 1, because the classification used in subsequent tables is based on the number of months
of welfare receipt as reported in the agency records. We did include the welfare income they reported to
us in our computation of monthly income.
4 There were 23 women who received SSI benefits in Fall 1999. In our studies of the determinants of
work (e.g., Danziger, 2001) we exclude them from analysis because they are not subject to the work
requirements of the new welfare system. We include them here because our focus is on the financial
well-being of all women in the sample. Our empirical results are not affected by their inclusion or exclu-
sion as they represent only 3.6 percent of the sample. 
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wave two, 43.7 percent; at wave 3, 54.7 percent. Respondents tended to move first
from being welfare reliant to being combiners, and then to wage reliance. The per-
centage of the sample who were combiners fell from 43.1 to 27.6 to 18.0 percent
between waves 1 and 3.
Table 1 presents, for each of the four groups, the percentage of respondents who
received income from each of the listed income sources or reported work-related
expenses and the average value for recipients for each income source and for work-
related transportation and child-care expenses.5
Work-based Income. Work-based income is the sum of respondents’ own earn-
ings and the earnings of other household members, less the estimated value of fed-
eral income and payroll taxes. For monthly income, neither the value of the earned
income tax credit (EITC) nor state income tax credits was imputed because they are
almost always received as a lump sum after the year’s tax forms have been filed.
Analysis of annual income (below) includes the EITC and state of Michigan income
taxes and credits. Taxes are imputed using the TAXSIM program of the National
Bureau of Economic Research (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993).
By definition, all wage-reliant women and all combiners had earnings in the month
prior to the interview, whereas welfare-reliant mothers and those neither working nor
on welfare did not. Wage-reliant mothers earned more than did combiners, $1065 vs.
$623, a differential that reflects both higher work hours and higher wage rates for
wage-reliant women. Compared with women combining work and welfare, wage-
reliant mothers were more likely to work 35 or more hours per week (69 percent vs.
38 percent), and they earned a higher average hourly wage ($7.83 vs. $5.89).
Substantial numbers of respondents co-reside with another household member
who had earnings in the month before the survey. About 40 percent of wage-reliant
mothers, 24 percent of combiners, 30 percent of welfare-reliant mothers, and half
of women neither working nor receiving welfare lived with an additional earner.
These other earners, many of whom were husbands or cohabiting partners, earned
on average substantially more than the respondents, the mean amounts ranging
from $876 to $1578. Interestingly, the lowest mean for the four groups is that of
other earners who reside with welfare-reliant mothers (although the mean for com-
biners is not significantly higher).
The third line of Table 1 subtracts estimated federal income and payroll taxes.
Both respondents and other earners were assumed to have paid the 7.65 percent
employee share of the payroll tax. Income taxes were estimated on total household
income for married women, and on total household income less the income of oth-
ers for women who are not married. (Lack of information precluded estimating
income taxes for other earners; see the Appendix for further detail.) Taxes are esti-
mated to average $164 per month for the wage-reliant, about $22 for the welfare-
reliant, and just under $70 for the other two groups.
Welfare-based Income. Three categories of welfare-based income are shown—
TANF cash assistance, food stamps, and income from SSI, Social Security, and
5 We do not subtract housing expenses from gross income in Table 1 because they are not work-related.
Our treatment of housing expenses is consistent with the recommendations for measuring the poverty
rate of the Panel on Poverty and Family Assistance (Citro and Michael, 1995). The panel proposed that
resources should include all sources of cash and near cash income and subtract taxes paid, work-relat-
ed transportation and child-care expenses, and out-of-pocket medical expenses. We do not have data on
out-of-pocket medical expenses. We do not account for the fact that residents of assisted housing will
pay higher rents when they move from welfare to work. Only 12 percent of wage-reliant mothers and 19
percent of women combining work and welfare reported living in assisted housing. And, in our sample,
mean rents were very similar across all work and welfare categories.
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other pension and disability income. Welfare-reliant mothers received TANF bene-
fits that averaged $365, combiners, $195. In Michigan, in 1999, the maximum cash
benefit for a mother with two children was between $450 and $500, depending
upon county of residence. Working recipients can keep the first $200 per month
without it affecting their benefits; each additional dollar earned beyond this
amount reduces welfare benefits by 80 cents. Assuming no income other than earn-
ings, a single mother with two children can earn approximately $800 a month
before cash benefits end.6
Both welfare-reliant mothers and combiners were much more likely to receive
food stamps as wage-reliant mothers and women not working or receiving wel-
fare—about 90 percent of those in the former two groups, compared to less than 40
percent in the latter two. 
The situation of women in this sample who combine work and welfare in a given
month is not atypical. The Urban Institute’s 1999 State TANF Income Calculator
was used to estimate monthly income for a hypothetical woman earning $625 per
month (the mean for combiners in Table 1). The estimated total income from earn-
ings, TANF, and food stamps, after adjusting for federal taxes and the federal earned
income tax credit ranges from $1119 to $1384 in the 10 states, including Michigan,
that account for 70 percent of the 1999 federal TANF caseload (Allen and Kirby,
2000; Urban Institute, 2000).7 In this sample, combiners’ average income was in
about the middle of this range.
One in six working mothers, about 40 percent of welfare-reliant mothers, and 27
percent of nonworking, nonwelfare mothers reported that they or someone else in
the household received SSI, Social Security, or other disability or pension income.
The higher incidence of receipt among the welfare-reliant suggests that care-giving
responsibilities for disabled household members may deter some respondents from
working or allow them to qualify for deferrals from the state’s work requirements.
Network-based Income. Two sources of network-based income are reported in
Table 1—child support and cash contributions from friends or family. Mothers not
receiving welfare were somewhat more likely to receive child support from an
absent father than welfare recipients, and the average amount of child support
received by nonrecipients was significantly higher. One-quarter of wage-reliant
mothers and one-fifth of women who neither worked nor received welfare, com-
pared with about one-sixth of mothers in the two welfare groups, reported receiv-
ing child support. The average monthly amounts received by those who received
any child support were $232, $106, $66, and $320, respectively. 
About 14 to 19 percent of the groups reported receiving cash contributions from
friends and/or family; the average amounts received ranged from $137 to 268 per
6 Some women who are classified as combiners reported to us earnings high enough to make them inel-
igible for TANF. In some cases this may have been due to administrative error and benefits may have
been recouped at a later date. However, some women may not have reported these earnings to the wel-
fare agency. Edin and Lein, for example, find that a substantial percentage of their respondents did not
report all of their income to the welfare agency. We did not ask respondents if they reported their earn-
ings to the state agency. However, the fact that we have cases where a woman reports substantial earn-
ings and the state reports that she received the TANF benefit for a family of her size with no earnings
suggests that some respondents have a higher income as combiners than they would have if they had fol-
lowed all income reporting requirements. 
7 The other states are California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and
Washington. These states, along with Michigan, contained 53 percent of the overall national population
in 1999 (Allen and Kirby, 2000).
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month. Just as with child support and the earnings of other household members,
welfare-reliant mothers received the smallest amounts on average.
Other Income. A very small percentage of respondents reported income from
unemployment insurance, worker’s compensation, or other income sources (e.g.,
insurance settlements). The amounts received are in some cases substantial.
Work-related Transportation and Child Care Expenses. Edin and Lein conclud-
ed that higher work-related transportation and child-care costs were one reason
wage-reliant mothers experienced more material hardships than welfare-reliant
mothers. Also, working women in this study had higher child-care and transportation
costs than did welfare-reliant women. The majority of both groups of working moth-
ers—86 percent of the wage-reliant and 67 percent of combiners—reported work-
related transportation expenses that averaged $91 and $71 per month, respectively. 
About one-third of the wage-reliant and one-quarter of the combiners reported
out-of-pocket child care expenses that averaged about $280 per month. About 10 per-
cent of nonworking mothers also reported work-related child-care expenses, proba-
bly because they were searching for work or had recently left a job. The percentages
of working mothers who reported child-care expenses were relatively low, in part,
because some received a state child care subsidy that covered part or all of their child
care costs (10.8 and 24.1 percent of the sample, respectively). Others relied on
unpaid care (13.9 percent of the sample), had no children under age 14 (10.8 percent
of the sample), or did not report using work-related care (27.3 percent of the sam-
ple). In Michigan, child care subsidies are available for all welfare recipients and for
working families whose income falls below 85 percent of the state median income.
State spending on child care has increased dramatically since 1996.
Net Monthly Income. There is much diversity in the receipt of these various
income sources. Income from nine sources was summed, and federal income and
payroll taxes and transportation and child-care expenses were subtracted. The
mean net monthly income is $1649 for wage-reliant mothers, $1205 for combiners,
$1014 for welfare-reliant mothers, and $1193 for women neither working nor
receiving welfare. (As mentioned above, net monthly income excludes the estimat-
ed value of the EITC and state tax credits because most women receive them as an
annual lump sum and not each month.)
Women who have left welfare for work have significantly higher income than the
other three groups; their average net income was about 37 percent higher than that
of combiners and 63 percent higher than that of the welfare-reliant. Combiners and
women who neither worked nor received welfare had incomes that were about 18
percent greater than those of welfare-reliant mothers, but these differences were
not significant.
The poverty rate and the mean income-to-needs ratio for the four groups show a
similar pattern. Poverty was calculated by dividing net monthly household income
by 1/12 of the 1999 official federal poverty threshold for the respondent’s household
size. Although workers had lower poverty rates than the welfare reliant, most work-
ers remain poor—49.1 percent of wage-reliant mothers and 77.2 percent of women
combining work and welfare. The highest poverty rate, 90.8 percent, was that of wel-
fare-reliant mothers. The mean income-to-needs ratio was also highest for the wage-
reliant (1.2 times the poverty line) and lowest for the welfare-reliant (0.7 times).
Annual Income
Data on monthly income tend to overstate the economic status of working respon-
dents because many of them do not work in every month during the year; they also
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tend to understate the economic status of nonworking recipients, because many of
them have worked in at least some of the months in the year prior to the interview.
For example, about 90 percent of respondents worked in at least one month in the
period between waves 2 and 3 (Fall 1998 to Fall 1999), but less than half worked in
every month.
To address this issue, annual income in calendar year 1998 was analyzed, and
respondents were classified by the work and welfare category that best character-
izes their situation during “most” of that year. A respondent was classified into a
work or welfare category only if she was in that category for at least 7/12 of the
time.8 Respondents who do not fall into one of these four groups are classified as
“mixers.” For example, consider a respondent who received welfare, but did not
work, in the first three months of the year, who combined work and welfare in the
next two months, and who then left welfare and worked in the last seven months of
the year. She would be classified in Table 2 as wage-reliant. However, if she had
been welfare-reliant in the first 3 months, combined work and welfare in the next
3, and been wage-reliant in the following six months, she would be classified as a
“mixer,” because she did not meet the 7/12 requirement for any single category.
This classification results in a somewhat different distribution of respondents in
Table 2—34.0 percent are wage-reliant, 25.0 percent are combiners, 16.6 percent are
welfare reliant, 7.4 percent are classified as not working and not receiving welfare,
and 16.9 percent are “mixers.” The biggest changes relative to the monthly cate-
gories of Table 1 are declines in the wage-reliant, increases in combiners, and
declines in those not working/not receiving welfare. Nonetheless, the patterns of
annual economic status across the group are quite similar—the wage-reliant have
much higher net income and a much lower poverty rate than the welfare-reliant.
The first row of Table 2 shows self-reported annual earnings during calendar year
1998. Wage-reliant mothers report the highest earnings, on average, $10,842; com-
biners, $7001; welfare-reliant mothers, $1163; women neither working nor receiv-
ing welfare, $2137; and mixers, $4652. Self-reports of total 1998 household income
follow the same pattern, with wage-reliant mothers reporting roughly twice as
much total income as welfare-reliant mothers. The one exception to this pattern is
that the small number of women who neither work nor receive welfare report total
household incomes very similar to those of wage-reliant mothers—$17,416.9
The third row presents mean annual income net of taxes (state and federal
income and payroll taxes are subtracted and the EITC and the Michigan renter’s
credit are added) and work-related transportation and child-care expenses, which
are the monthly 1998 values for these expenses multiplied by 12.10 Because many
wage-reliant women did not work in every month, this annualization of monthly
expenses probably understates their total income and overstates that of welfare-
reliant women. Nonetheless, women who were wage-reliant for most of the year
8 We also considered classifications that required a respondent to have been in a category for 2/3 or 3/4
of the months. The differences in the number of women in each group and differences in income across
categories were not very sensitive to the choice of a cutoff.
9 The small number of women in this group were more likely than those in the other groups to either
live with another earner or to report SSI or pension or disability income. For example about half of the
wage reliant met these criteria compared to about two-thirds of the “neither” group.
10 Almost every working mother was estimated to have been eligible for the EITC. For wage-reliant moth-
ers, rows 2 and 3 in Table 2 are virtually the same, suggesting that, on average, the EITC and home-
owner’s credit were just about equal to the sum of federal income and payroll taxes, state income tax and
work-related child-care and transportation expenses.
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have a net household income 86 percent greater than that of the welfare-reliant;
women who combined work and welfare during most of the year have an annual
income that is 41 percent higher.
Poverty rates are quite similar in Table 2 to those shown in Table 1 for nearly all
groups, and the pattern is consistent despite the annual categorization of work and
welfare status rather than the monthly status and the inclusion of the EITC in Table
2, but not in Table 1. The wage-reliant have much lower poverty rates (49.1 percent)
than the welfare-reliant (88.1 percent), with combiners falling in the middle (70.6
percent). The major change between Tables 1 and 2 is the large reduction in the size
of the no work/no welfare group, and the increase in their economic well-being.
Moving from welfare to combining work and welfare to wage reliance is associated
with increased economic well-being. Poverty rates, however, remain high for every
group.11
Adverse Selection of Nonworkers 
Respondents who have left welfare for work have a higher net income and lower
poverty rate than those who remain welfare-reliant. However, some portion of these
income differences might be due to differences in the attributes of workers and wel-
fare recipients. Previous research (Danziger, 2001; Danziger et al., 2000) has shown
that nonworking respondents have more of the 19 barriers to work measured in Fall
1999 (e.g., physical health problems, mental health problems, low education, and
labor force skills) than those who were working. Using the monthly categories of
Table 1, for example, wage-reliant women averaged 2.0 barriers, combiners 3.1 bar-
riers, and welfare-reliant mothers 4.7 barriers. 
Also, nonworking recipients might have other unmeasured attributes, such as
ability or motivation, that lower both their likelihood of employment and their
expected earnings if employed. Adverse selection suggests that the benefits of mov-
ing from welfare to work are likely to be higher for those who became wage -reliant
than for those who remained welfare-reliant. If this is the case, the income gains of
moving from welfare to work that are shown in Tables 1 and 2 might be overstated.
To explore the potential effects of adverse selection, fixed-effect regression mod-
els were estimated. By controlling for all individual-specific factors that are con-
stant over time, the method eliminates some omitted variable biases (Powers and
Xie, 2000). By specifying individual-specific fixed effects, a consistent estimator of
the income gains from moving from welfare to work can be derived, provided that
the unobserved traits and their effects do not change over time.
As shown in the equation below, each variable is averaged over all time points for
a specific woman. This average value is then subtracted from the value at a specif-
ic time point for that woman. As a result, the time-invariant measured and unmea-
sured characteristics of a woman, such as race, drop out of the model.
Yit = β'Xit + γ · HOURSit + αi + εit, 
⇒ (Yit–Yi) = β'(Xit–Xi) + γ(HOURSit–HOURSi) + εit-εi (1)
11 When we combine the wage-reliant and the no work and neither work nor welfare groups to get a
“leavers” group, the annual 1998 poverty rate was 49.5 percent. This compares with 59 percent in
Wisconsin, but we included more income sources than did Cancian et al. (2000).
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In this model, Yit indicates monthly income net of taxes for individual i in time
period t;12 αi is the individual-specific constant term that accounts for the unob-
served time-invariant factors; HOURSit is the monthly hours that woman i worked
on all jobs in year t;13 Xit and is a vector of individual demographic characteristics
and barriers to work. Three observations for each woman are included, Fall 1997,
Fall 1998, and Fall 1999. Time-variant characteristics included in the X vector
include the number of individuals living in the household, the number of children
under age 6 in the household, and a dummy variable indicating if woman i at time
t was cohabiting with a husband or partner. Based on work by Danziger et al. (2000)
and using variable specifications defined there, dummy variables are also included
for five barriers to employment—(1) if the respondent lacked either a car or driver’s
license; (2) if the respondent met the diagnostic screening criteria for a mental
health disorder; (3) if the respondent cared for a child with a physical, learning or
mental health problem that limits the child’s regular activities; (4) if the respondent
had a physical health problem; and (5) if the respondent experienced severe physi-
cal partner abuse in the last 12 months. 
Also included are interaction terms between time and four time-invariant vari-
ables that could affect wage growth: 1) race, a dummy variable indicating if the
respondent is an African-American, 2) the number of years the respondent received
cash welfare between the time she turned 18 and the Fall 1997 survey; 3) a dummy
variable indicating if the respondent had low job skills prior to 1997; and, 4) a
dummy variable indicating if the respondent lacked a high school diploma. 
Fixed-effect regression results presented in Table 3 show that for every hour a
woman works, her monthly net income increases by $2.63. The magnitude of this
coefficient represents the effect of each additional hour of work net of taxes, and
the reduction in food stamps and cash welfare. If it did not pay to move from wel-
fare to work, this coefficient would not be significantly different from zero.
Likewise, if differences in the characteristics of the women themselves, either
measured or time-invariant unmeasured characteristics, were the primary deter-
minants of the increased income associated with moving from welfare to work,
we would expect to find net income differences largely explained by other factors
besides work effort. We do find that living with a spouse or partner and increas-
es in household size are associated with higher monthly income and that an expe-
rience of domestic violence is associated with a decrease in income. Of the vari-
ables used to examine differential levels of wage growth over time, having less
than a high school education is associated with lower monthly incomes in 1999
and years on welfare is associated with a positive, although substantively small,
increase in income. 
The estimated magnitude of the income gain from work is substantial. Table 1
shows Fall 1999 monthly income differences between the wage reliant and welfare
reliant of $635. In Fall 1999, wage-reliant women worked about 144 hours per
month more than the welfare reliant. This differential in hours evaluated at $2.63
per hour yields a monthly income difference of $379, or about 60 percent of the
12 For the purposes of regression analysis, the net monthly income variable does not subtract work-relat-
ed expenses because such information is not available for calendar year 1997. In addition, the EITC is
included in monthly income. The wording for monthly income items changed slightly between waves 2
and 3. For waves 1 and 2, respondents were asked to report categories of income for “you or your hus-
band/partner.” In wave 3, respondents were asked to report income for “you or anyone else living here.”
13 Monthly work hours are defined as self-reported hours worked per week multiplied by 4. 
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observed monthly income difference between the two groups. Thus, even after con-
trolling for measured and time-invariant unmeasured characteristics, we find that
it does pay to move from welfare to work. A number of different model specifica-
tions that were estimated yielded similar results. 14, 15
Table 3. Fixed-effect regression results predicting net monthly income.
(Standard Errors in parentheses)a
14 We examined different definitions of income to test for sensitivity in measurement error. In addition
to the measure of net monthly income presented in Table 3, we examined net annual income and gross
monthly income less other household members’ earnings. The coefficient for hours worked in the annu-
al income equation was $2.17; in the net monthly income less other household members’ earnings model
the coefficient on monthly hours of work was $2.64.
15 To control for self-selection, we also estimated instrumental variable models, with or without fixed
effects, for all three measures of income. We used the district welfare office to which the respondent was
assigned as our instrument, since the assignment process is close to random. In contrast to the com-
monly expected direction of selection bias, we find even greater returns to work in the IV regression
results. The details of these analyses are available from the authors on request.
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Experiences of Material Hardship 
Experiences of material hardship were analyzed as was the extent to which moth-
ers engage in activities to make ends meet.16 Women who moved from welfare to
work were found to be better off in several non-income aspects of economic well-
being, and worse off only in terms of access to health insurance and having fore-
gone medical and dental care.
Using questions similar to those reported in Mayer and Jencks (1989), and Edin
and Lein (1997, p. 113), respondents were asked about 10 types of material hardship.
Respondents in Table 4 are classified into work and welfare categories based on what
they were doing in 7/12 of the months between waves 2 and 3.17 Wage-reliant moth-
ers were significantly less likely to experience three of the material hardships com-
pared to welfare-reliant mothers–having experienced moderate or severe hunger18
(12.2 vs. 28.6 percent), having experienced a night of homelessness (2.1 vs. 10.0 per-
cent), and having experienced a telephone cutoff (25.9 vs. 48.6 percent). They were
also less likely to have five or more of eight housing upkeep problems,19 to have had
utilities cut off and to have been evicted, but these differences were not statistically
significant. The extent of hardship for women combining work and welfare tends to
fall between those of these two groups for most measures.
The main exceptions to this general pattern were lack of health insurance and
having unmet medical and dental needs.20 More than one-third of wage-reliant
mothers did not have health insurance for themselves, and 13.1 percent did not
have insurance for their children. In contrast, almost all welfare-reliant mothers
and combiners had medical insurance for themselves and their children. Unmet
medical and dental needs were a problem for 41.3 percent of wage-reliant mothers,
but only 3.9 percent of their children.21 This loss of health insurance in the transi-
tion from welfare to work is similar to Edin and Lein’s finding that working moth-
ers experience greater hardship than welfare-reliant mothers. 
In the bottom part of Table 4 the percentages of women are reported who experi-
enced no hardships, one hardship, or two or more hardships, and the mean num-
16 As mentioned above, our data were gathered during in-home interviews. By the end of the third wave,
the typical respondent had spent about 3-1/2 hours with one of our interviewers. Because Edin and Lein
spent more time with their respondents, our data on income and expenses may not be as complete as
theirs. However, we have little reason to expect that there are differential response biases in the sample
across women classified by their work/welfare status. 
17 The same classification is used for respondents in Table 5. The median number of months between
waves 2 and 3 was 14; it ranged from 8 to 19 months.
18 Hunger is measured using the Household Food Security scale from the Current Population Survey.
Moderate hunger in households with children is defined as 8 to 12 affirmative responses to the 18-item
scale; such a score represents a reduction in adults’ food intake “to an extent that implies that adults have
repeatedly experienced the physical sensation of hunger.” Severe hunger is defined as more than 12 affir-
mative responses, and implies both that children have experienced hunger and that adults “have repeat-
edly experienced more extensive reductions in food intake.” (Bickel et al., 2000, pp. 12-13). 
19 Respondents were asked if they had experienced these eight housing upkeep problems in the year prior
to the interview—leaky roof or ceiling; plumbing problems; rodents or insects; broken windows; broken
heating system; electrical problems; lack of stove or refrigerator; inadequate garbage pickup. Those who
reported five or more have “severe problems.”
20 Respondents were asked, “Was there any time since the wave 2 interview date that you needed to see
a doctor or dentist but could not afford to go?”
21 Medicaid expansions and CHIP now provide coverage for almost all children below 150 percent of the
poverty line. Thus, the lack of insurance reported here may indicate a lack of knowledge about eligibili-
ty. If these children were brought to an emergency room for treatment, it is likely they would be signed
up by the hospital for Medicaid or CHIP. It may also help explain why the percentage of children not
receiving needed medical care is so much smaller than it is for their mothers.
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ber of hardships—first including all 10 hardships, and then excluding two medical
insurance questions. There are no significant differences across the five groups,
although the wage-reliant are more likely to have no hardships than the welfare
reliant when medical insurance is excluded (41.3 vs. 31.4 percent), and have a lower
mean number (1.03 vs 1.31). The loss of Medicaid by women who leave welfare for
work and who either do not work for an employer who provides health insurance
or cannot afford required premiums is a serious problem that was not addressed by
the 1996 welfare reform. 
Activities to Make Ends Meet
Respondents were questioned about activities they might have pursued to make
ends meet and to raise their material well-being, including informal or irregular
work-related activities, such as selling food stamps or seeking charity. Edin and
Lein note that “taking a job made the pursuit of work-based strategies more diffi-
cult, so that mothers that relied upon these strategies would realize a net loss when
they went to work” (1996, p. 263).
Table 4. Experiences of material hardship by work and welfare status between the Fall
1998 and Fall 1999 interviews.
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Table 5 shows the proportion of women, classified by their work and welfare
category in most of the months between the Fall 1998 and 1999 interviews, who
reported engaging in each of the listed activities during the six months before the
Fall 1999 interview (receipt of charity is measured over the entire period
between waves). Welfare-reliant mothers were significantly more likely than
wage-reliant mothers to have pawned or sold personal possessions for cash (20.0
vs. 7.3 percent), sold or traded food stamps (4.3 vs. 0.3 percent), and received
food, shelter or clothing from a charity (54.3 vs. 24.6 percent). About two-thirds
of welfare-reliant mothers engaged in at least one hardship-mediating activity,
compared to about two-fifths of combiners and one-third of the wage reliant.
Women who neither worked nor received welfare resembled the wage reliant and
mixers resembled combiners.
Although these results are consistent with those of Edin and Lein, the interpreta-
tion reported here differs. They suggest that wage reliant mothers had less time to
pursue these alternative strategies and were thus disadvantaged by working. The
results here suggest that working mothers were less likely to pursue these strategies
because their net income was higher and poverty rate was lower, and hence they
had less need to pursue activities, such as pawning possessions, selling food stamps,
or seeking charity, all of which carry social stigma or legal risk. 
Subjective Well-being
Finally, respondents’ subjective assessments of their material well-being were exam-
ined. Table 6 reports the distributions of responses to the question: “How difficult
is it for you to live on your income right now?” Because this question is based on
the respondents’ situation at the time of the interview, the Fall 1999 monthly work
and welfare classification was used.
If Edin and Lein’s conclusion about the economic disadvantages of moving from
welfare reliance to wage reliance remained true post-welfare reform, wage-reliant
mothers should, on average, have reported more difficulty living on their house-
hold income. The results in Table 6 are the opposite: 53.5 percent of wage-reliant
mothers answered that it was “not at all difficult” or “a little difficult” compared to
35.6 percent of welfare-reliant mothers. Only 9.5 percent of wage-reliant mothers
and 13.2 percent of combiners said that it was “extremely difficult,” compared
with 28.7 percent of the welfare-reliant. According to their own subjective evalua-
tions, working mothers reported less difficulty making ends meet than did welfare-
reliant mothers. 
CONCLUSION
When Edin and Lein (1997) compared the material well-being of wage-reliant and
welfare-reliant single mothers in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they concluded
that it usually “did not pay” for welfare mothers to take a job. More recent research
(Bavier, 2000; Cancian et al., 2000) found modest financial gains among welfare
recipients who became wage-reliant after welfare reform. This issue was revisited
using Fall 1999 panel data; those who had moved from welfare to work were
found, objectively and subjectively, to be better off financially than those who
remained welfare reliant. Working mothers had higher household incomes, lower
poverty rates, experienced a similar level of material hardships, were less likely to
engage in activities to make ends meet, and reported less difficulty living on their
current incomes.
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Several factors contributed to these differences in well-being. First, some combi-
nation of a tighter labor market, a higher minimum wage, the increased EITC,
increased medical insurance for children, and increased subsidies for child care
made work pay more relative to cash assistance in the late 1990s than at the begin-
ning of the decade. Second, a substantial portion of our respondents combined wel-
fare and work. This reflects a recent policy shift, as many states increased the
amount of earned income that is disregarded in the computation of welfare bene-
fits. Women whose earnings would have disqualified them from cash assistance a
decade ago can now receive some welfare benefits and maintain Medicaid for them-
selves and their children.
Results reported here are consistent with those of Edin and Lein and others in
several respects. First, they confirm that many working mothers could not make
ends meet on their paychecks alone; they continue to receive government assistance
(e.g., TANF, food stamps, EITC) or to rely upon cash contributions from friends and
family. Second, poverty remains high, even among the wage reliant; about half of
the wage-reliant mothers reported experiencing at least two material hardships dur-
ing the previous year; and about one-quarter of the wage reliant and one-third of
combiners reported receiving food, shelter or clothing from a charity.
The policies now in place have changed economic incentives so that they are in
accord with the goals of PRWORA—i.e., on average, wage-reliant mothers and those
combining work and welfare are financially better off than welfare-reliant mothers.
Yet, insufficient policy attention has been paid to factors that may have prevented
those who remained welfare reliant about three years after the Act’s implementa-
tion from making the transition to work. The new economic incentives and the
increased pressure to leave the welfare rolls suggest that few welfare-reliant moth-
ers are able to reject work and choose to stay on welfare. It seems more likely that
many of them have problems, such as poor physical or mental health or lack of job
skills, which prevent them from getting jobs even when unemployment rates are
low (Danziger, 2001; Danziger et al., 2000). 
Even though it now pays to move from welfare reliance to wage reliance, there
remains a need for additional policy enhancements to make work pay enough so
that a greater percentage of working mothers can escape poverty and afford med-
ical insurance, as well as a need for enhanced policies to help welfare-reliant moth-
ers move into regular jobs or into subsidized employment.
Table 6. Subjective financial strain by work and welfare status in Fall 1999.
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